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ODP 14-969

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18 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ISSG/OS

25X1A FROM: [REDACTED]  
Deputy Chief, Information Management Staff

SUBJECT: Draft Security Requirements for Automated  
Information Systems Located in Overseas  
Installations

1. We have reviewed your draft on security requirements for overseas ADP applications. As CRAFT and other automated applications move toward implementation in the field, we are particularly anxious to regularize the planning and implementation of necessary security for these functions. Therefore, we present some comments and observations in the following paragraphs.

2. In our view, it is essential to place the overall responsibility and approval authority for these applications on the Deputy Director for Operations. We see ISSG performing a critical function in terms of expert guidance and recommendations. But it is to be noted that likely NOC needs, certain operational applications and cover requirements will sometimes dictate applications outside of standardized security criteria. DCID 1/16, for instance, was obviously written with CONUS systems, not field, ADP applications in mind. Also, must the Department of State, which is also automating overseas posts, honor DCID 1/16 requirements for themselves, and how do we mesh with State on ADP security requirements?

3. We can foresee that the Office of Communications will have a particularly significant role in the security of our overseas information systems. Notwithstanding your draft recommendation for a qualified ADP systems security officer in the field, the DO does not have positions to dedicate to this responsibility and, generally speaking, does not envision enlarging our overseas personnel strength as we move toward automation. It is, accordingly, very likely that the Office of Communications personnel in the field will perform many of the ADP systems security requirements you foresee. It is to be noted that the Office of Communications has already accepted responsibility for the maintenance of all (Agency Standard) CRAFT equipment to be located in DO field posts. Further, it is expected that some of the CRAFT equipment involved overseas may be housed in the station/base communications facility and thereby be principally affected by OC security requirements.

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4. We believe the draft should also make mention of the role of IMS in the security of overseas information systems. The Directorate for Operations has centralized information management, with IMS specifically charged to plan, evaluate, test, pay first year costs for and install automated information systems in the field. In this respect, we speak for the user area divisions in such areas as audit trails, systems software and access controls.

5. It would now seem appropriate for representatives from ISSG, ODP, the Office of Communications and IMS to review in common a number of technical considerations you raise in the draft. Some of our technical questions are attached. If you agree, we will schedule such a meeting.

25X1A 6. In the meantime, where overseas CRAFT issues are  
involved, please contact Mr. [REDACTED] For general  
25X1A issues and planning involving automation in the field, please  
contact Ms. [REDACTED]

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Attachment:  
As stated

cc: Director of Communications  
Director of Data Processing

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Information Management Staff Technical Questions  
Re Draft Security Requirements for Automated  
Information Systems Located in Overseas Installations

1. Reference Paragraph III.A.2. Clarification is required on the unique qualifications necessary for the position of field ADP System Security Officer. Under the CRAFT concept, there will be no ADP professionals at DO field stations and, therefore, the resident ADP knowledge will be superficial at best.

2. Reference Paragraph IV. If intelligent programmable terminals, such as the Delta Data 7000, qualify as ADP systems vice user terminals, then this paragraph is considered overly restricted in terms of the definition and requirements for an "ADP Facility".

3. Reference Paragraph IV.A.5b. and C.4d. For other security or operational reasons, it may be appropriate to have some CRAFT equipment in the communications vault area (not the OC ). It is suggested that this provision be reconsidered in view of physical space considerations at the field station and the expense of constructing and maintaining two separate secure areas. It is recognized that user terminals located within the communications vault could cause access control problems, but needed access to the minicomputers would be minimal. Further, the use of the communications personnel on site to perform those functions necessary to place the minicomputer in operation may well be the most desirable and efficient utilization of station personnel. In this latter case, it would then be advantageous to have the minicomputer co-located with the communications center.

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5. Reference Paragraph IV.D.4b(2). Reference should be provided to the "current security approved destruction procedures" for magnetic media.

6. Reference Paragraph IV.D.5a(1). Identification of terminals by location will require either modification to standard terminals or the development of a TEMPEST approved  to 25X1 provide this capability. Guidance in this area will be required.

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